than at creating employment. In a situation of excess labour supply, one can hardly expect supply-side measures to restore the equilibrium.
Therefore, activating labour supply should go in tandem with more structural policies.
INTRODUCTION
Our article describes a number of mechanisms that cause inefficiencies and undesired side-effects in targeted labour market policies for disadvantaged groups. It summarizes the results of a transnational and multidisciplinarythough still explorative -research commissioned by the European Commission's Third Poverty Programme 1 . The 'poor' as a target group are very sensitive as a touchstone for evaluation, because of the gap that separates them from the average job seeker whose needs are mostly used as a yardstick in the design of policies. Our study is focussed on mainly five EUmember states : Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, and the United Kingdom. It is based on case studies and a literature review.
Throughout this article, we will make a flexible use of terms such as 'poverty', 'disadvantage', and 'social exclusion'. Generally speaking, we refer to 'the poor' as individuals and groups whose material, cultural and social resources are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the country in which they live (see the definition given by the Council of the European Communities in its Council decision of December 19, 1984) . The more recent shift in terminology from 'poverty' to 'social exclusion' is essentially meant to emphasise the multidimensionality, the duration, and the structural causes of poverty. However, in a policy context, one has to acknowledge the gap between the theoretical definition of concepts and their operational use. Target groups of policies, or administrative categories, are never defined in such a holistic way as to represent exactly the 'poor' or the 'socially excluded'. Moreover, it is indeed useful and necessary to consider the poor in connection with related social groups (low-skilled or 1 Nicaise et alii (1995) . The book and article are written by independent experts and do not necessarily reflect official points of view of the European Commission.
long-term unemployed, minimum income recipients, school dropouts, workers in the secondary labour market, single-parent families, disabled persons, migrant workers, ...) because these are the categories targeted by policy makers and with which they either overlap or compete on the labour market.
Our analysis is confined to policies aimed to (re)integrate unemployed people into the regular labour market, leaving aside, for example, preventive actions to maintain jobs, or policies focused on the upgrading and regulation of labour conditions. Within the (re)integration strategies, we concentrate on selective programmes targeted at disadvantaged groups, but we also consider general programmes as far as they are relevant for the poor. The analysis covers a wide range of actions, including (pre)vocational education and training, recruitment incentives, direct employment programmes, 'social economy initiatives', orientation and guidance, as well as all kinds of mixed programmes.
The expected economic effects of targeted labour market measures can be roughly classified into three categories : (ii) labour market outcomes for beneficiaries : does the measure enhance the employment opportunities, earnings, quality of jobs for the target group ?
(iii) macro-economic effects : can one observe effects on the general level of unemployment, wages, the government's budget ?
Our discussion of pitfalls and dilemmas will be ordered accordingly.
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
From a distributional point of view, the so-called Matthew effect 2 , or the 'law of perverse distribution' is a well-known phenomenon in the literature on social expenditures (Deleeck, Huybrechs, Cantillon, 1983) . In the context of labour market policy, it refers for example to the over-representation of young, short-term, highly skilled job seekers in training programmes. However, this phenomenon should not be considered as a religious, nor as a social or natural law; it is also the consequence of wrong policy design, and hence, can be avoided.
Legal and administrative barriers to entry
A first possible explanation is that the most disadvantaged groups are almost by definition not eligible for participation in mainstream labour market programmes (wage subsidy schemes, enterprise allowance schemes, training...). Most programmes are confined either to registered unemployed, or even in some cases to those entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.
In Belgium in 1993, only 475 000 individuals who were 'remunerated full-time unemployed actively seeking work' had access to programmes such as Guidance Plan, Youth Recruitment Plan, or the Enterprise Allowance Scheme.
312 000 other -registered -unemployed people (including the part-time unemployed, the disabled, minimum income recipients, other unemployed not entitled to benefits, and the unemployed aged over 50 who are automatically 'exempted from control') therefore had no access to the Creaming off : the false dilemma between equity and efficiency ?
Verdié and Sibille (1992) carried out a detailed case study of the French AIFscheme (Actions d'Insertion et de Formation). This scheme is targeted specifically on the long-term unemployed (LTU) and within this category, those designated as priorities were : people who had been out of work for a very long period of time (more than three years), the over-50s and people in unstable situations, such as those in receipt of a minimum income allocated for integration purposes (RMI = Revenu Minimum d'Insertion).
The study reported a large percentage of people not officially entitled to benefit from the initiative. Among the five 'départements' studied, the most 'dynamic' department can boast the greatest number of people who should have been disqualified from the initiative because they had been registered for too short a time with the employment office (one in two); it also had the lowest percentage of "over-50s" (5%) and the highest proportion of advanced training courses (for more than half of the trainees).
The evaluators identify a number of explicit as well as implicit mechanisms that explain this bias. The officers from the employment agency themselves claim their selection procedures are based on:
-efficiency (priority is given to people who are thought to be most 'motivated' and have a goal in mind, as they are thought to have the best employment prospects after participation). Or then again when the officers choose people from the short-term unemployed category, they feel they are helping the people to avoid "joining the army of long-term unemployed later on"; -recruitment difficulties;
-"humanitarian" reasons: it would be impossible not to allow someone to participate in a scheme on the grounds that he has not been out of work long enough.
Another possible criterion, one that is less explicit, is based on the fact that the AIF initiative includes on-the-job training and the credibility of the employment service officers is at stake in the eyes of the employers whom the officials might be induced to propose candidates to later on (this primarily concerns the employment offices). It is therefore tempting to select trainees who are most likely to be employable, who already have some skills and have not been out of work for too long a period.
Training bodies that are awarded the "quality clause" by the public employment service are entitled to larger subsidies and sometimes the clause is conditional upon the number of trainees that find a job immediately after completing a scheme. Yet the evaluation studies produced some evidence that 'absolute' placement rates may be seriously biased as a performance criterion applied to provisions for different target groups. One of the key conclusions of the Belgian study was that initiatives targeted on the most disadvantaged groups are, when considered in "output" terms, less successful in helping people back to work than other measures. However, in "value added" terms (differences in placement rates between beneficiaries and non-benefiaries with the same characteristics), the initiatives for disadvantaged people turn out to be highly effective and often more so than other kinds of measures. For example, pre-vocational training schemes for the least skilled showed placement ratios (six monts after the scheme) around 40% only, compared to a 65-80% range for more advanced training courses. However, the 40%-result of the pre-vocational training schemes meant a doubling of the employment probability for their (disadvantaged) target group, which in relative terms is a better performance than the one reached in the advanced courses. after controlling for the trainees' personal characteristics.
Besides their expression in relative terms (with comparison groups), genuine efficiency criteria should also involve a dynamic perspective. On the cost side, they should take into consideration, for the most disadvantaged groups, the length of time needed to gain access to the labour market, especially under difficult economic conditions. On the benefit side, on the other hand, one should take account of the fact that disadvantaged job seekers (in the absence of intervention) are facing a longer expected duration of unemployment, and hence the expected return from placement is much higher for categories at risk than for the average unemployed. In other words, the placement of disadvantaged persons is worth more, in terms of social cost-benfit analysis, than the 'easy' placement of job seekers from stronger groups. From this perspective, the whole equity-efficiency dilemma as it is perceived so far by many policy makers and administrators in this area looks rather short-sighted and may well be a false one indeed. This issue has been acknowledged in textbooks of labour economics (see e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991 : 473-75) , but apparently, it is still not applied in practice.
Inconsistencies between measures and 'reverse substitution'
In a context of targeted labour market policies, substitution is generally interpreted (and accepted) as a reversal of the 'normal' queuing mechanism, whereby individuals from disadvantaged groups get new employment opportunities that would otherwise be opened for better A similar problem has been noticed in some northern EC-member states, with ESF-interventions focussed equally on youngsters ('ESF-objective 4') and LTU (objective 3'), with a real danger of reverse substitution at the expense of LTU.
This danger was accentuated by the fact that the relatively well-educated young unemployed are more easily reached by policy measures than the LTU, who are often discouraged by previous failures and poor employment expectations. As the budgets for objective 4 were exhausted more quickly than those for objective 3, a tendency to shift budgets from LTU to youngsters was observed in some countries.
Insufficient supply and within-group substitution
To explain the relation between insufficient supply and substitution within a target group, let us consider a simplified (theoretical) case : suppose that a new job search assistance scheme is targeted at the LTU, but that, due to budget constraints, current resources are merely reallocated to assist half of the target group (selected at random) more intensively, instead of serving the whole population in a usual way. In this setting it can reasonably be expected that the flow of vacancies to the LTU remains unchanged. It is obvious that the employment probabilities will be merely redistributed within the group of LTU : beneficiaries will improve their position, whereas the position of non-participants from the same target group deteriorates.
To our knowledge, the concept of substitution within target groups has been recognized but never measured in practice. However, obvious cases of within-group substitution have been observed in some mandatory programmes. In the UK, it has been argued that changes in legislation which were designed to ensure that young people (aged 16 to 18) are either in 
Positive discrimination has drawbacks too
There are many examples of exceptions to the normal eligibility criteria for programmes, which result in a form of positive discrimination : for example in the UK exceptions may be made for women who are returning to economic activity after child-rearing, for recently released prisoners, for people with disabilities, for people recently quitting the armed forces, for those with difficulty with literacy or numeracy, and in other special cases such as in areas with large-scale redundancies. In Belgium MIG-receivers with the status of 'head of household', and those under 25 years of age enjoy priority treatment in some cases, while in France there is a general category for exemption for those experiencing problems with exclusion, as well as priority status for those unemployed for longer than three years, for MIG-recipients who have been unemployed for more than one year, for unemployed people of over 50 and for people with disabilities.
While there are clearly examples of good practice aimed at positive discrimination, one question which must be asked is how far these priorities are substantiated by objective studies of the relative disadvantage of different groups. For example, in many countries, eligibility for labour market programmes is closely linked to the duration of one's unemployment spell.
Each episode of unemployment begins a new time period, so a person who repeatedly leaves the unemployment register, perhaps to undertake short spells of seasonal work, will never reach the duration threshold which provides access to a scheme. In other words, intermittent workers with an equally long unemployment experience are implicitly discriminated against by the mere definition of unemployment duration. This amounts to a special case of 'within-group substitution' or even 'reverse substitution'.
Another question is how well the rules are publicised to employers as well as to the population groups who would benefit most by taking advantage of them. It must also be acknowledged that detailed priority rules tend to make legislation and administration more complex -sometimes even incoherentand that in some cases they are rather designed for reasons of demand management than for social reasons. As a consequence, the question remains whether positive discrimination induces underutilization or indeed a better targeting of measures.
A final drawback of positive discrimination is the risk of stigmatization of beneficiaries. This implies that hidden handicaps are revealed to employment services or to employers by the mere fact of 'benefitting' from a special programme. For example, in Luxembourg, the beneficiaries of the RMG (minimum guaranteed income), received, during the first years of implementation of the law, an introduction card to the employment services coloured differently from that of other job seekers. Needless to say, this scheme proved to be highly discriminatory. It has in fact since been suppressed.
EFFECTS FOR THE BENEFICIARIES
A number of recent evaluation studies of selective labour market policies have pointed at poor, and sometimes even zero or negative employment effects (see for example, OECD, 1993; Pedersen and Westergård-Nielsen, 1993 ). In the absence of deeper analysis, one would be tempted to attribute the causes of the failure to the target group or to the concept of the measures as such. Yet there is quite some evidence about poor implementation or management of the measures, which can be avoided in the future.
Mismatches between provisions and needs of disadvantaged groups
In Denmark, the mandatory training courses for long-term unemployed people in the framework of the job offer scheme have been subject to lots of discussion in recent years. Not more than 13 percent of the participants appears to have a job within six months after leaving the course (Thaulow and Anker, 1992) . According to Jensen et al. (1992) the employment effects of the courses are even negative, compared with a control group of nonparticipants with the same profile. Westergård-Nielsen (1993) found positive effects for employed participants in AMU-courses, while the same courses yielded negative employment results for LTU. Among the many reasons that were put forward, one possible explanation is a mismatch between the scheme and the needs and capabilities of LTU : in the survey by Thaulow and Anker (1992) , about 25% of the trainees declared that the courses did not suit at all their capabilities or needs; correspondingly, about 40% of the individuals in public job-offers said they had no experience whatsoever with the work they were supposed to do. This in turn caused demotivation on the part of many beneficiaries.
There is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the needs and motivations of disadvantaged job seekers. However, the conclusions converge on the following points. Some long-term unemployed have had problems at school and their fear of repeated failure can prevent them from attending courses.
The best way of overcoming this problem is that training courses correspond to the qualifications and stimulate the self-confidence of the unemployed (rather than making them compulsory).
One shortcoming of many training schemes is that they are too short for groups who lack elementary skills such as literacy and numeracy, or basic work attitudes. Or in some cases, pre-qualifying courses exist but are not linked with subsequent stages of training so that the process stops halfway.
Training is generally considered as an investment with uncertain outcome.
The 'costs' of this investment on the part of the unemployed may be threefold :
-direct material constraints, like the financial cost (transport, child care, material...) or simply the absence of facilities to respond to these practical problems;
-indirect financial costs : participants have to postpone or reduce their job search activities while they attend courses and hence are increasing their expected unemployment spell in the short run. Policy-makers should acknowledge that neither the direct material costs, nor the indirect costs can be borne by poor participants : in other words, adequate remuneration of participants is an essential condition for success;
-it is also necessary to remove the psychological constraints, in order to enable unemployed people to participate in programmes and achieve good results. Obstacles such as a negative self-image, fear for failures, threat of exclusion, fatalism... should be removed by linking provisions with social assistance in a holistic approach. Also, positive support seems to be a better incentive than pressure and sanctions.
Some of the most disadvantaged unemployed (older, totally unskilled, longterm unemployed) are less keen to participate in training than the average job seeker. For them, training is not necessarily the best strategy to start with.
When the expected return to training is lower -e.g. for reasons of age or former school failure -or when the financial need is so urgent that it does not allow for postponed incomes, direct employment seems to be a better response in the short run, possibly supplemented by training in a second stage. This justifies the strategy of many local employment initiatives, sometimes called 'social economy projects', which give priority to (non-profit) employment over training.
Considerations of this type have induced the Danish government to modify its job and training offer scheme in the sense of a diversification of services, with different options at each stage. In this way the pressure of the mandatory scheme is also mitigated.
Mismatches between provisions and needs of the labour market
There are different, yet all unsatisfactory, methods to measure the degree of matching between provisions and needs of the labour market. A fairly simple method is to ask ex-participants (e.g., ex-trainees) who have found a job after the programme how far they perceive a correspondence between the content of the programme and their subsequent employment. A recent evaluation, following this method, of the Flemish public training agency revealed a 'complete non-correspondence ratio' of 30 to 40% for vocational training courses. Although these figures cannot be compared to similar studies in other countries, they do not seem very uncommon since on the whole, these courses appear to be fairly effective (see Bollens and Nicaise, 1994) .
Despite the difficulties encountered in measuring the phenomenon of (mis)matching, there is much 'anecdotal' evidence of provisions for disadvantaged groups being geared towards weak labour market segments.
This applies to training as well as job creation projects, especially in smallscale, local initiatives.
The economic potential for local initiatives of this sort is a small one. Attempts to develop businesses and create jobs through initiatives in the "classic" Work') in the UK by Alan Felstead (1994) indicates that this programme is largely inclined to provide skills which are not in much demandparadoxically, due to the output related funding of the local training companies (TECs -see above). When the cost per output in some area such as construction and engineering trades is higher, the TECs have more economic incentives to provide output in low-cost areas such as clerical and secretarial occupations. This will result firstly in a relative excess supply of these areas. A second consequence is that training providers are being segmented into providers of specialists (Colleges of further Education or dedicated workshops) and large providers of low skill trainees.
Segmentation and sidetracks
The recent movement towards decentralisation of efforts and resources -finally, local non-profit organisations offer training programmes that reflect the specific needs of disadvantaged groups, rather than needs of the labour market.
All three types of providers have their strengths and weaknesses. However, in some cases, unhealthy competition leads to discrimination against the private non-profit sector, which then faces problems of insecure and irregular funding, and hence, a higher turnover of staff, discontinuities in programmes, a weaker management, and poorer outcomes.
Analogous segmentation processes can be observed among local job creation initiatives, where again three models can be distinguished :
-'work experience initiatives' offering just a temporary job, often combined with on-the-job training, with a view to transferring the worker to the regular labour market within a well-defined time limit. The 'entreprises d'insertion' in France are the typical example;
-'social cooperatives' (Germany, Italy) functioning on a quasi-commercial basis, whose aim is to create new and permanent jobs in a 'niche' of the market;
-'social workshops' (Netherlands, Flanders, Germany) that work on a nonprofit basis, offering permanently subsidized jobs to the least 'employable' job seekers.
Every type of initiative seems to respond to the needs of a specific subgroup.
But social workshops, which depend more heavily on subsidies, tend to become more vulnereable themselves when the subsidies are inadequate.
As a consequence, their poorer economic performance tends to be transferred to the target group and to act as a self-fulfilling prophecy, thus indeed limiting the mobility of participants towards the regular labour market (see the section on stigmatisation below).
Dead ends
The "Contrats emploi solidarité" (CES -solidarity for work) contracts represent one of the major instruments of labor market policy in France (660.000 contracts in 1993) offering half-time jobs for a limited time in the non-market sector (including a training offer in some cases) to the vulnerable unemployed (LTU, MIG-receivers, young unemployed with no vocational qualification...). While this instrument represents a first offer of integration to a large number of people suffering from social exclusion, it has to be noted that for a large group of the participants, this does not go beyond a temporary solution. CES contracts are followed in too many cases by a new period of redundancy. A regular work contract as a result of a CES contract is certainly not the rule.
The problem with the integration of disadvantaged groups in public employment programmes is also recognized in the Netherlands, namely in the 'labour pools' ('banenpools') for the LTU, as well as in the Flemish 'back to work' programme ('Weer-Werk'), and in the Luxembourg ATI-scheme 
Carousels
This mainly refers to the idea that different arms of the administration may attempt to shift the responsibility for unemployed clients from one to another, as the desire to reduce their costs, reduce their degree of responsibility, or achieve administrative targets takes precedence over the needs of clients.
As a result, the effect of integration programmes is sometimes very temporary and does not imply any long-term progress on the side of the beneficiaries.
In Denmark there are examples of carousels in the Job Offer scheme, and arguably in the employment projects run by the municipalities where MIGclients are employed just long enough to render them eligible for the (nationally funded) unemployment insurance scheme. As the income maintenance of the uninsured unemployed is expensive for the municipalities, some of the municipal provisions are used, not to integrate the unemployed, but to make them eligible to claim benefits from the insurance system. As soon as the unemployed become eligible, they are no longer entitled to benefits from the social assistance system. In this way part of the measures are managed for the sake of institutional interest, which results in the unemployed being pushed from one system to another.
In Belgium a similar carousel is thought to be the temporary work programme designed to move clients from social assistance back into social security (art.
60#7 of the law on social welfare centres). This is illustrated by some striking findings from an evaluation carried out by Van de Velde (1990) ; retrospective interviews with 173 individuals who had participated in the scheme three years earlier revealed that nearly all of them had indeed gained access to unemployment insurance. However, 91.5% had fallen back into unemployment immediately after the scheme; 61.4% were unemployed at the time of the interview, while 48.5% had remained unemployed for the whole three years following the scheme. Those who did fall back into longterm unemployment run the risk then of being excluded from unemployment insurance, and having to return on social assistance. Two important reasons for these bad results were the absence of training offers (only 5% had attended a formal training course) and the lack of guidance and mediation.
As a consequence of these findings, the scheme was reorganised so as to include training and guidance for all participants. A second evaluation, 3 years after the reform (Wouters, Van Meensel and Nicaise, 1994) revealed that fewer participants (42%) had fallen back to persistent unemployment despite the economic recession of the early 1990s. In a third phase, the scheme was again improved by including intensive guidance and counselling services.
In Luxembourg another kind of carousel is observed by field workers, who call it 'social and training tourism'. Among young people taking part in initial vocational training in 1990, 30% had participated in one or more programmes before; and 60% had at least one job before with an average employment duration of more than 20 months. Only 24% of participants had had no work experience and no training.
Stigma effects
We talk about stigma effects, in the narrow sense, when hidden handicaps Following a study of Burtless (Dayton, Ohio; 1985) on the effectiveness of a targeted wage subsidy (intended to increase the employment of MIGreceivers by offering employers reimbursement for part of those worker's wages), job seekers given experimental vouchers identifying them to employers as eligible for a generous wage subsidy were significantly less likely to find employment than were similar job seekers without vouchers.
In Europe, a risk of stigmatization appears to be associated with mandatory programmes. In Denmark, one of the reasons for the negative performance of the training offer scheme for LTU -besides possible mismatches between provision and needs -is said to be the rather bad reputation of the scheme among employers (Aakrog et al., 1991) . Negative employment effects were also found by Dolton, Makepeace and Treble (1993) for YT, the Youth Training scheme in the UK, which is a more or less mandatory scheme as well. They suggest that stigmatisation may be the main cause of this disappointing result. Other British studies (White and Mcrae 1989 ) have pointed at the stigma effect of YT, although it is very difficult to prove. However, if the results of these studies are correct, non-participation in the scheme may in some cases be a rational choice on the part of the individual, even if he/she would lose benefits, because (a) it would signal to employers that one is 'better' than the participants and (b) it would leave more time for job search.
MACROECONOMIC IMPACT
A well-known factor reducing the net impact of a labour market policy is and Ashenfelter, 1986; OECD, 1993) . Bushell (1986) evaluated a British scheme of wage subsidies to employers conditional upon the recruitment of LTU : he estimated the deadweight effect at 63%. de Koning (1991) measured an effect of barely 40% in a similar Dutch scheme, by means of econometric analysis. A sub-programme of the Dutch scheme, targeted at very long term unemployed and ethnic minorities, was even found to have no deadweight loss at all (de Koning, 1992) . Wood and Hamilton (1989) found a 69% deadweight in a study on Jobstart, a wage subsidy paid to LTU for accepting a job within 3 months. As concerns direct employment schemes, few comparable figures are available as evaluation techniques are different; however, some studies suggest that they are effective in terms of net job creation, sometimes even more than training or wage subsidies, if at least they are targeted at the structurally unemployed (Eriksson, 1991; Bellman and Lehman, 1990) . De Munnik (1992) reports a deadweight effect of only 15% in the Dutch 'labour pools' (banenpools), whereas PACEC (1992) estimates that 2/3 of the jobs created in the UK's 'Inner cities' task force initiatives' are not really new.
Admittedly, the mere existence of deadweight losses in labour market programmes does not imply that they are ineffective; but it should be borne in mind that the net employment creation effect of targeted programmes is in most cases only a fraction of their gross impact.
The limited macroeconomic impact of 'active labour market policies' is hardly surprising, if one considers its underlying philosophy, which, according to Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, (1991 : 472-481 ) is mainly to 'improve the search efficiency of the unemployed', or in other words, to boost labour supply 4 . After the unforeseen experience of stagflation in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the bankruptcy of Keynesion demand stimulation and labour supply reducing programmes, the basic idea of active labour market policies is to stimulate growth and simultaneously fight inflation by supply stimulating measures.
Whereas this argument seems logical concerning the markets for goods and services, it is less straightforward for labour markets, which are already characterised by a situation of excess supply. Stimulating labour supply by means of active labour market policies may thus indirectly enhance unemployment rates and poverty.
The advocates of active labour market policy will reply that it does not only aim to increase labour supply, but rather to increase its flexibility. LTU and low-skilled job seekers should be retrained and geared towards the new, dynamic sectors of the economy, in order to avoid rigidities and wage inflation, and to raise their productivity; contracts should be made more flexible to lower the fixed costs of labour; etc. (Andersen, 1992) . To some extent these strategies are quite legitimate, given the handicap of high 4
In fact 'active labour market policies' are more ambivalent than our discussion suggests, some measures even aiming to stimulate demand through cost reductions. However, we have deliberately simplified the argument in order to clarify the argument. The parallel existence of demand-stimulating measures does not fundamentally alter our critique anyhow. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The objective of this article is certainly not to 'prove' the ineffectiveness of targeted labour market policies or to plead for their abolition Rather, we want to contribute to their improvement by pointing at some major problems which can, in most cases, be overcome. In this final section, an attempt is made to draw together the main conclusions of the previous sections into a coherent set of policy recommendations, addressed to the national and local authorities as well as the European Commission. These conclusions will be rearranged in the following order : design, targeting, operation, and outcome. We close the section with a comment on the consistency between targeted and general labour market policy. 4 Mandatory programmes may be seen in some circumstances as useful measures, but they should be avoided as a rule, as they cause demotivation of participants and stigma effects. The sanctions involved when 'beneficiaries' do not comply with the rules, or simply the lack of adequate supply tend to result in the opposite of (re)integration.
A good equilibrium between compulsion and efficient help can be reached by offering different options and outcome guarantees to the participants (see the recent reform of the Danish job and training offer scheme).
Targeting and accessibility
5 Before engaging in specific measures for separate groups, all existing forms of discrimination should be abolished. One of the basic principles of every labour market policy should be the right of every person at active age to participate in the labour market and to have access to all existing services for job seekers.
Defining some groups of the population a priori as being 'out of the labour force' (single parents, older unemployed, disabled persons...) should be regarded as a hidden form of discrimination.
Limiting access to labour market programmes to job seekers entitled to unemployment insurance benefits is even worse, a direct form of social exclusion.
6 Registration as a job seeker should be facilitated, e.g. through automatic registration of some categories of social security recipients. Automatic deletion from the register for administrative reasons should be avoided. Perverse substitution effects (i.e. giving more help to less disadvantaged groups) should be avoided by establishing a clear, legally approved hierarchy of priority groups, based on objective criteria such as outflow probabilities from unemployment, multiple deprivation and so on.
8 Guaranteed services (like the Danish Job offer scheme) are a better means to ensure a minimum of equity in the delivery of services to the unemployed. They are a concrete way to realize the 'right to labour', and a necessary counterpart to compulsion.
In some provisions (e.g. training programmes, recruitment subsidies) quota systems for particular target groups can also be used as an alternative to separate provisions.
9 Mixing target groups with different handicaps (e.g. disabled and hard-toplace unemployed) in single measures may cause double stigmatisation and should therefore be avoided.
Operation
10 The socially excluded deserve well-managed services for their reintegration into the labour market. Some well-intended local initiatives (training as well as employment projects) suffer from a poor management : they can be improved by the extablishment of adequate quality criteria for their approval and funding, and/or by providing management advice services.
11 Setting up partnerships and networks is an important element for a succesful implementation of the 'routing' principle, as no single operator is able to offer the complete range of services that may be useful for combatting exclusion from the labour market. Five (types of) partners were indentified in our research, each with its strengths and weaknesses : public agencies, private organisations, employers, trade unions, and organisations representing the target groups.
12 The funding of private, local provisions needs to be made more adequate and secure, in order to allow for the development of professional and stable services. In the context of operational programmes cofinanced by the ESF, the lack of long-term guarantees for small NGO-projects and the delays for payment caused by the different hierarchical stages in administrative procedures constitute a serious handicap, that could be overcome by prefinancing and longer-term agreements.
13 The injudicious use of output-related funding may turn out very harmful for the most disadvantaged groups and may even be quite inefficient from a social cost-benefit point of view (see point 15). It seems preferable to base funding on the extent and characteristics of the target group and on criteria related to the quality of the services delivered.
Outcomes and evaluation
14 Our whole report has demonstrated the need for a continuous and rigorous evaluation of labour market policies and provisions, by pointing at examples of inefficiencies and perverse effects.
15 The short-term placement ratio (x months after participation in a programme) is a fairly simple, but socially and economically biased evaluation criterion : socially, as it tends to show better results for programmes geared towards stronger groups, and thus to reinforce creaming off mechanisms; economically, because it does not account for the long-term effects of policies.
A more balanced evaluation of employment effects would be based (a) on 'differential' rather than absolute placement ratios (i.e. compared to a reference group of non-beneficiaries with similar characteristics); (b) on longer-term analyses (the long-term benefit of reintegrating disadvantaged individuals is expected to be greater than for the average unemployed).
16 Besides merely quantitative employment effects, one should take account of aspects like equality of access, the quality of the obtained jobs (contract terms, stability of employment, concurrence between training and job, perspectives of the sector...), and psychological and social effects.
17 Furthermore, one must not forget the (possibly substantial) side effects of targeted labour market policies on non-participants. In our study, we focused on negative side effects for equally or more disadvantaged groups rather than the 'classic' deadweight and substitution effects.
'Within-group' substitution occurs in some cases when a policy measure has a limited coverage and actually drains services and opportunities away from equally disadvantaged individuals in favour of beneficiaries. It can be overcome by providing for a sufficient capacity to cover the whole target group.
'Reverse substitution' means that stronger measures are taken in favour of less excluded groups (e.g. youngsters), thereby reinforcing the exclusion of the less privileged (e.g. LTU, MIG-receivers). It can be avoided by establishing a clear hierarchy of priority groups (see point 7).
18 The fear for substitution in general must not be exaggerated, however.
Selective labour market policies generally aim at a redistribution of opportunities rather than at large-scale job creation. However meaningful the 'additionality' criterion included in many programmes may be, it should not give way to 'sidetrack' provisions, which in the long run cut off reinsertion processes
Similarly, the intention to avoid deadweight and substitution through a more narrow targeting of measures should be weighed against the drawback of possible stigma effects.
The examples of deadweight and different types of substitution elaborated in the text (one of them relating to ESF-interventions) confirm the need to evaluate policies in favour of disadvantaged groups against a broader macro-economic and social background.
Consistency between targeted and general labour market policies
This brings us back to one of the key issues of section 3, namely, the relation between the fight against social exclusion on one hand, and the growing dualisation of European societies on the other. Although the macroeconomic context of the labour market was not the focus of this study, it appeared unavoidable to devote some comments to this fundamental issue.
Even if there were a consensus about the statement that the growing unemployment, dualisation and poverty in Europe are triggered by external shocks (oil shocks, socio-demographic shifts), much less agreement would be reached about the unavoidability of their persistence, as well as the strategies to combat them.
Economic theory and policy seem to have lost their problem-solving power.
From a purely economic point of view, everybody would agree that unemployment is to be interpreted as an excess supply in labour markets.
Nevertheless, after the failure of demand-boosting and supply-reducing policies in the 1970s and 1980s, the present strategy ('active labour market policies') seems to be focused on the victims themselves : supply is stimulated, flexibilized, put under pressure in order to control wage pressures and inflation, but who believes that this will bring us back to full employment ?
And everybody knows that neither economic growth, nor 'more Europe' -however desirable they both may be -will be the ultimate answers.
From a social point of view, active labour market policies -if they are well designed and targeted -redistribute probabilities of employment, but are not really increasing employment for all.
It appears to us that this contradiction can only be overcome by 'embedding' the targeted approach into a powerful macro-economic policy mix of employment creating measures, which stimulate labour demand without boosting inflation. This may include alternative social security funding methods, as well as a general redistribution of labour and income. The latter is obviously not a simple strategy because it requires a new social consensus, a new equilibrium of power, a greater solidarity.
